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Abstract 
We analyze a model of multi firm competition between mobile network operators. 
The model assumes inelastic usage demand and full penetration, and allows for 
asymmetric termination rates, differences in marginal costs and vertical 
differentiation. A key property is that operators’ equilibrium profit is unaffected by 
an identical change in all termination rates in the market - we call this the profit 
neutrality hypothesis. The model is well suited for econometric implementation. We 
use a panel data set comprising north western European mobile operators to 
estimate equilibrium profit functions and find that we cannot reject the profit 
neutrality hypothesis. The results suggest that a reduction in mobile termination 
rate levels in mature markets will not necessarily benefit consumers. 
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1. Introduction 
When a mobile subscriber calls a subscriber on another mobile network, the originating 
network operator pays a fee per minute to the terminating operator. These fees, denoted 
Mobile Termination Rates (MTRs) are frequently regulated. The national regulatory 
authorities in the EU member states consider mobile operators as de-facto monopolists 
in the wholesale voice termination market. The operators are therefore subject to ex ante 
regulation in this market irrespective of the competitive pressure in the retail market. 
The levels of mobile termination rates vary substantially between states in the EU and 
are frequently asymmetric within each state.1 The European Commission, and the 
national regulators, wants to reduce and harmonize mobile termination rates across 
member states and within each state, see European Commission (2008) and European 
Regulatory Group (2007).  
Policy makers, notably Viviane Reding, the EU's Telecoms Commissioner, expect a 
reduction in termination rates to benefit consumers.2 However, the economic literature, 
which we briefly review below, is inconclusive on the welfare effects of such a 
reduction as well as the distributional effect on consumer surplus and profits. 
This paper presents empirical evidence on the effect of mobile termination rates on 
operator profits. We use a panel data set comprising a subset of European mobile 
operators. We find that profits increase in the operator’s own termination rate and 
decrease in the average level of competing operators’ termination rates. Moreover, we 
cannot reject that profits are unaffected by an identical change in all mobile termination 
rates. Thus, our results support the claim that profits in the mobile industry are 
unaffected by the level of mobile termination rates. 
The seminal papers by Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole [1998a, 1998b] 
provide a general framework to assess the outcomes of competition between 
interconnected network operators. In this literature competition is modelled as a two-
                                                 
1 The European Regulators Group (ERG) carries out MTR benchmark studies. According to the European 
Regulatory Group (2007), the MTR benchmark study in January 2007 identified 25 countries that allow 
asymmetric MTRs and 6 countries where the regulator imposes symmetric rates.  
2 EUROPA Press Releases. Reference: IP/07/1333 Date: 14/09/2007 
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stage game. In the first stage the termination rate of each network is determined, and in 
the second stage the networks compete in attracting customers. The principal question is 
whether the networks, in an unregulated economy, can use the termination rates as a 
collusive device to soften competition in the second stage. In particular, the case studied 
is that of a symmetric duopoly where the two firms agree on reciprocal (symmetric) 
termination rates. A major insight is that the effect of changes in the symmetric 
termination rate on the networks’ profits depends on the call-plans offered to 
consumers. With the above move order, this effect is unaffected by whether the 
symmetric charge is negotiated by the firms, or set by regulatory authorities.  Armstrong 
(2002) and Jullien and Rey (2008) provide excellent reviews of the literature building 
on the above cited papers. Focusing on calling party pay regimes, the main results on 
the effects of changes in reciprocal termination rates on profits in symmetric, full 
participation duopoly can be summarized as follows3 4: 
• Armstrong (1998) and Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) study the case with 
linear pricing and no discrimination based on whether the call terminates on-net 
or off-net. They find that an increase in a symmetric termination rate increases 
profits. In this case the networks can use a high termination rate as an instrument 
to soften competition at the second stage by raising each other’s marginal cost.  
• Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998a) demonstrate that the profit raising effect 
disappears when the networks compete in two-part tariffs with no network based 
discrimination at the second stage. Profits are in this case independent of the 
termination rate. The increase in profits from incoming off-net traffic following 
an increase in the termination rate is exactly matched by the profit loss due to 
the induced decrease in the fixed fee. Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004) extend 
the basic model to allow for customer heterogeneity. They find that the profit 
neutrality result still holds when the networks compete in menus of non-linear 
tariffs as long as all customer groups participate in equilibrium. 
                                                 
3 Asymmetric duopoly with two part tariffs has been investigated by Carter and Wright (2003), de Bijl 
and Peitz (2002) and Peitz [2005a, 2005b].  
4 Calzeda and Valletti (2008) and Jeon and Hurkens (2008) consider models with more than two firms. 
However, these papers focus on symmetric firms.  
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• Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) and Gans and King (2001) consider the case of 
network based discrimination.5 Gans and King (2001) show that when the 
networks compete in two-part tariffs with network based discrimination an 
increase in the termination rate decreases profits. The mechanism is that the 
competing networks have an incentive to negotiate a termination rate below 
marginal costs because this softens competition for market shares at the second 
stage.6 The effects of an increase in the termination rate when the networks 
compete in linear prices with network based discrimination are ambiguous. 
Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998b) find that profits increase when the networks are 
not too close substitutes, while the effect is ambiguous otherwise. 
It is not easy to draw on these results to predict the effects on profits (or welfare) of a 
reduction in mobile termination rates as put forward by The European Commission. 
Firstly, the results are derived in symmetric duopoly. All European states have more 
than two operators which are frequently highly asymmetric in terms of market shares 
and termination rates. It is a reasonable conjecture that the theoretical results referred to 
above could be generalised to symmetric, multi-firm competition, but not to asymmetric 
market structures. Secondly, most European mobile operators offer a menu of call plans 
that include all of the tariffs discussed above. Consequently, it is hard to assess which 
tariff dominates the competitive situation. 
Building on Armstrong (2002) we develop a theoretical model of competition between 
two or more, potentially asymmetric, interconnected networks. A key modelling 
assumption is that usage is inelastic. This simplifying assumption enables us to derive a 
simple closed form solution for equilibrium profits. We show that an identical change in 
all termination rates does not affect profits. Thus, similar to the models where networks 
compete in two-part tariffs with no network based discrimination, the current model 
exhibits a form of profit neutrality.  
                                                 
5 Network based discrimination exists when the on-net minute price differs from the off-net minute price. 
An on-net (off-net) call is a call originated on one network and terminated at the same (another) network.  
6 In line with this the authors argue that bill-and-keep may be a form of tacit collusion. 
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We estimate the model using a panel dataset on firm specific mobile termination rates 
and profits comprising 26 mobile operators in 9 European countries in the period 2003-
2006. The econometric model performs very well with significant parameters of 
expected signs. The main result is that we cannot reject the profit neutrality hypothesis, 
i.e. that profits are unaffected by an identical change in all mobile termination rates.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: In section 2 we develop the theoretical 
model of competition between asymmetric networks. In section 3 we describe the data 
and present the econometric specification. In section 4 we present and discuss the 
estimation results. Finally, we offer some concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. Multi-firm competition 
The final objective of this section is to derive a closed form equilibrium profit function, 
i.e. profit as a function of termination rates, suitable for econometric implementation on 
firm data from European mobile markets. This involves the following major challenges: 
Firstly, most markets include more than two firms. The firms vary in size and possibly 
marginal costs, and are frequently subject to different termination rates. Secondly, most 
mobile firms offer a menu of call plans that include all the tariffs reviewed in the 
previous section.7  
There are no models that can cope with these issues simultaneously in a tractable way. 
Clearly, some powerful simplifying assumptions are necessary. The approach taken here 
is to generalize the unit demand, asymmetric duopoly model in Armstrong (2002) to  
firms
N
8. As shown below this generalisation has a simple closed form solution for 
equilibrium profits.  
                                                 
7 There is limited public information on the distribution of customers and profits on different call plans. In 
their quarterly reports, most operators split the figures on the number of customers, traffic revenues and 
minutes in the categories 1) Prepaid and 2) Subscription. The former category resembles linear tariffs, 
while the second category comprises various forms of non-linear tariffs including the two-part tariffs 
discussed in the literature. However both the linear and non-linear tariffs frequently include call plans 
with and without network based discrimination. Hence, it is hard to put the special cases discussed in the 
literature to an empirical test. 
8 Section 4.2.4 in Armstrong (2002)  
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The model 
Assume that subscribers’ demand for calls is inelastic, i.e. independent of the calling 
price, and that the calling pattern is balanced, i.e. that all customers, irrespective of 
which network they subscribe to, are equally likely to receive a call. As a normalisation, 
each subscriber makes exactly one call in the time period under consideration (this 
normalisation is relaxed in the empirical implementation). Finally, we assume that the 
market is fully covered i.e., , where  is the number of customers of firm i, 
X is the total number of potential customers, and the market share of firm i, . 
XxN
i i
=∑ =1 ix
Xxs ii /=
These assumptions are basically equal to those in the asymmetric duopoly model in 
Armstrong (2002).  
Given the unit demand, the mobile networks compete for customers in a single price . 
One interpretation is that the networks compete in ‘total charges’ for making the 
exogenous number of calls
ip
9.  
There are  interconnected mobile firms in the economy (the national market). 
Without loss of generality, we assume zero fixed costs per subscriber and that the 
marginal cost of originating a call is equal to the marginal cost of terminating a call. 
These marginal costs can vary between firms, such that, for network i, an on-net call 
consists of origination and termination costs, . Let  denote the termination rate 
network i receives per incoming call. A call from network i to network j thus has 
perceived marginal costs , and the (wholesale) margin on an incoming call is 
.  
2≥N
ic2 ia
ji ac +
ii ca −
Profit for firm i is then given by 
                                                 
9 The present model also closely resembles section 6.3 in de Bijl and Peitz (2002) where the networks 
compete in ‘flat-rate’ tariffs, i.e. a subscription fee and a zero charge for calls. Such tariffs exist in some 
markets, but are not widespread. A related, very frequently offered tariff is that of ‘included minutes’ – a 
tariff with a subscription fee, an included number of minutes at a zero charge, followed by a positive 
marginal charge. This kind of three-part tariff has however, to our knowledge, not been analysed in the 
context of interconnected networks, see Grubb (2007) for a general analysis without interconnection.   
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444 3444 21444444 3444444 21
profits Wholesaleprofits Retail
2 ∑∑ ≠≠ −++−−= ij iijiij jijiiiii casXsacscspXsπ . 
Using the full market cover assumption this profit expression can be simplified to 
 ( )( )∑ ≠ −+−= ij jijiiii aascpXs 2π . 1) 
The market shares entering the profit expression are functions of the vector of prices, 
, and, in the present case, a vector of exogenous or predetermined 
firm specific characteristics, , 
{ Nppp ,...,, 21=p }
{ }Nuuu ,...,, 21=u
 0),,( <∂
∂=
i
i
i p
sss up . 2) 
Normally we would consider situations where all products are substitutes, but 
Proposition 1 below also holds in the case where 0<∂∂ ji ps  for some pairs of i and j. 
The vector of firm specific characteristics, u , is a parameterization that allows 
asymmetric market shares even if all prices are equal.  
The game proceeds in the usual fashion: At stage 1 the firms’ termination rates, 
 are determined, for instance set by the regulatory authority; at stage 2 the 
firms compete one-shot in prices. 
Naaa ,...,, 21
If we differentiate 1) with respect to price and rearrange, we can write the first-order 
condition for firm i, , as: Ni ,...,2,1=
 ( ) ( ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂−−−= ∑∑ ≠
−
≠ ij ji
i
j
i
i
iij jijii
aa
p
s
p
ssaascp 12
1 )
                                                
. 3) 
The solution of the first-order conditions gives a candidate equilibrium. In general, an 
interior equilibrium will exist if conditions are not ‘too asymmetric’, and if the firms’ 
products are not ‘too close substitutes’.
N
10 The interior equilibrium is a price vector 
 
10 With “Hotelling style” market share functions, the interior equilibrium is unique, see the next section. 
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},...,,{ 21
∗∗∗∗ = Npppp  that satisfies the first-order conditions such that 1,0,1 ∈= ∗∗∑ ii ss  
. The equilibrium market share of firm i is given by   ii ∀≥∗ 0and π
 , 4) ),,( uca∗∗ = ii ss
and equilibrium profit of firm i, , is obtained by inserting  and  in 1). In the 
following discussion we will assume that an interior equilibrium exists. 
∗
iπ ∗p ∗s
The duopoly model in Armstrong (2002) is a special case of the current model. As 
shown there, equilibrium market shares are independent of the termination rates. This 
result does, however, not carry over to the situation where the number of firms is larger 
than two. The following invariance property holds in the general case: 
Proposition 1. If an interior equilibrium exists, equilibrium prices, market shares and 
profits are identical under  and { }Naaa ,...,, 21=a { }dadada N +++= ,....,,~ 21a  for any 
d.  
Proof. In the first order conditions, 3), termination rates enter as differences, . 
Hence, equilibrium prices, market shares and profits of all firms , are 
unaffected by an identical change in all termination rates. Q.E.D. 
ji aa −
Ni ,...,2,1=
This result may be compared with the profit neutrality result obtained when the 
networks compete in two-part tariffs with no network based discrimination [Laffont, 
Rey and Tirole (1998a), Dessein (2003) and Hahn (2004)]. In general, these authors, 
and others, are very careful not to overestimate the robustness of the profit neutrality 
result. In particular the dependence on symmetry is stressed.11 In contrast, the present 
                                                 
11”This analysis of two-part tariffs and nonlinear pricing seems to suggest that the choice of termination 
charge cannot affect  profits at all…. However, it is important to stress that this convenient result is non-
robust in a number of dimensions. For instance the assumed cost and demand symmetry across networks 
plays an important role in the argument”, Armstrong (2002), p. 370. “I do not make any claim of 
robustness of the above profit-neutrality result. In particular, as is clear from the proof of Proposition 3, 
what is needed is (i) symmetry in demand, ..” Dessein (2003) , p. 602. “Note that the profit-neutrality 
result has been reached under several simplifying assumptions. In particular, we needed the following: 
Uniformity (symmetry) in demand.”, Hahn (2004) , p. 622. Furthermore, footnote 21 in the previous 
citation stresses that “Symmetry in marginal cost seems also crucial”. 
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result is very robust to asymmetric conditions: The result holds even if firms are subject 
to different termination rates, different marginal costs and vertical differentiation. 
Equilibrium profits 
In line with most of the theoretical literature on competition between interconnected 
networks we take as our point of departure a Hotelling style product differentiation. We 
assume that all consumers buy one and only one variety and that the market share 
functions satisfy:  
  σ=∂
∂
i
j
p
s
, all j ≠ i, σ > 0 (A.1) 
 ( )σ1−−=∂
∂ N
p
s
i
i . (A.2) 
A.1 and A.2 imply multi firm competition in the sense that every firm is in direct 
competition with all other firms. Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992) characterize 
this property as “strong gross substitutes”. A necessary condition for this property to 
hold is that M ≥ N – 1, where M is dimensions of an attribute space and N is the number 
of competing firms, see Theorem 4.3 p 115 (ibid).  
A1 and A2 are satisfied in the model by von Ungern-Sternberg (1991). The spatial 
interpretation of the von Ungern-Sternberg model is that each firm is located at the 
corners of an equilateral multidimensional pyramid. Consumers are uniformly 
distributed on the line segments connecting all corners of the pyramid. The consumers 
incur a travelling cost when consuming services. In contrast to von Ungern-Sternberg 
we do not allow corners without a firm.12 This “no vacant corner assumption” however, 
allows us to analyse asymmetric equilibria. The assumptions A.1 and A.2 imply that 
every service is a neighbour to all the other services in the attribute space i.e. that all 
cross price effects are strictly larger than zero. The parameter σ  measures the disutility 
associated with distance in the attribute space.  
                                                 
12 We are not analysing entry and exit in our model. Thus, disallowing vacant corners does not restrict the 
analysis. 
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The parameter σ  will typically differ between markets (countries) due to differences in 
the number of competing firms. A.1 and A.2 are fulfilled in the Hotelling duopoly case, 
as well as in a Salop type circular city (Salop, 1979) with three firms. An example of 
market shares satisfying (A.1) and (A.2) is the ‘Hotelling style’ market share function: 
 ( )))1(()1(1 ∑∑ ≠≠ −−−−−+= ij jiij jii ppNuuNNs σ , 5) 
where the u ’s are the firm specific characteristics introduced earlier. 
Proposition 2. If an interior equilibrium exists and the market shares obey (A.1) and 
(A.2) equilibrium profit is given by 
 ( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−−+−=
∑ ≠∗∗
11
12
N
a
a
N
sX ij
j
iii σπ  6) 
Proof. By inserting the rule for optimal pricing 3) using (A.1) and (A.2) into the profit 
definition 1) we obtain: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+−⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −+−+−−= ∑∑∑ ≠≠≠ ij jijiiij jiiij jijiii aasscaaNsaascXs 21)1(2 σσπ
 
Rearranging this expression using , gives 6). Q.E.D. ∗= ii ss
Hence, in accordance with the classical Hotelling duopoly model, equilibrium profit is a 
function of squared market share. It is easily verified that in symmetric duopoly 6) is 
given by .  σσπ 4/1/)( 2 == ∗∗ ii s
When market shares are given by 5), some tedious calculations show that the second 
order condition is ( ) 0)1/(12 <−+−− −ii aaN σ , where ∑ ≠−− −= ij ji aNa 1)1( . Hence, 
the second order conditions restrict the degree of asymmetry in the mobile termination 
rates in the market. Furthermore, if termination rates satisfy the second order condition 
for all operators, the profit function is globally concave in own-price and any interior 
equilibrium, if it exists, is unique.    
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A key feature of 6) is that it is separable in equilibrium market shares. As will be shown 
in the next section, this is a very convenient feature for the current econometric purpose. 
The separability is a consequence of the, admittedly, very restrictive assumptions A1) 
and A2).13  
 
3. Data and econometric specification  
The primary goal of the paper is to test the profit neutrality hypothesis, Proposition 1 in 
the previous section. To guide the specification of the econometric model, we use the 
profit function in 6).  
Definitions and descriptive statistics 
The data are from Ovum and Wireless Intelligence, and comprise 26 mobile operators in 
9 countries located in north-western Europe14. The countries are similar in the sense that 
they are all high-income countries with a very high mobile penetration. Thus they come 
close to satisfying the assumptions of full participation underlying the theoretical 
model. The data contain quarterly information on key operator indicators, market 
statistics and termination rates in the period Q1 2003 to Q3 2006, see Table 1 below for 
further details. 
Let subscript t denote period, i firm, and k the national market of firm i. We ignore 
international and fixed line traffic. In relation to the current model this implies that the 
mean of the termination rates on outbound traffic of firm i is taken over all other mobile 
operators in firm i’s national market, i.e. ∑ ≠− −= ij jtkit aNa )1/(1 . We shall discuss 
some possible implications of this simplification in the next section. To avoid 
cumbersome notation it is implicitly assumed that the summation is taken only on 
                                                 
13 Alternatively, if the market shares are of the logit type such that: μjiij ssps =∂∂  
 and μ)1( iiii ssps −−=∂∂ , it is easily shown that equilibrium profits are given by  ( )( )∑ ≠ ∗∗∗∗∗∗ −−+−= ij jjiiiiii asassssX 1)1/()( 2 μπ  .While it is possible to estimate this 
function, it is not separable in market shares. We will not pursue this specification here. 
14 The countries are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Sweden 
and The United Kingdom. 
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operators within each national market ],..2,1[ Kk ∈ . The number of firms in each 
national market is not time indexed because there is no operator entry or exit in the 
markets in the sample period.  
Let  denote the termination rate per minute of firm i in period t. The theoretical 
model in the previous section assumed unit demand, i.e. that each customer made 
exactly one call per period. If we assume that this call has a duration of one minute we 
have that  for each firm i. It is now easily verified that if we instead assume 
that each customer make, say 30 calls of one minute per period, the profit function 
would be like in 6) with 
itmtr
itit mtra =
3itit mtra = 0. Following this reasoning we let 
 where  is the average number of originated mobile 
minutes per customer in country k in period t. Consequently, we assume that the 
customers in market k have an inelastic demand equal to  each period, and that 
evolution in  is due to exogenous shocks.  
KkiMmtra ktitit ∈∈∀= , , ktM
ktM
ktM
As a measure of operator profit we use ebitda (earnings before interests, taxes, 
depreciations and amortisations). Since there is no investment in the theoretical model, 
this is the economic performance indicator that comes closest to the profit measure, itπ , 
in equation 6). 
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables Explanation Mean Std.dev Min Max 
Definitions      
  itebitda Quarterly earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortisation of firm i (in 
million Euros).  
280.81 266.82 -11.05 1007.83
  itmtr Mobile termination rate per minute of firm i in Euros. 
0.12 0.04 0.06 0.21
  its Firm i’s market share (of customers) 0.30 0.14 0.08 0.58
  ktM Average, quarterly number of mobile  minutes in national market k  
141.08 41.57 74.00 253.00
  ktX Number of mobile customers, in  millions, in market k  
33.87 28.28 3.47 83.12
   kN Number of mobile network operators in market k. Time invariant in sample.  
3.58 0.82 2 5
Dependent   
   ity 2/ itktit sXebitda . 121.88 66.68 -249.00 523.02
Explanatory   
  ita ktit Mmtr . 50.64 20.77 23.83 136.18
 ita−  ktij jtk MmtrN ∑ ≠− )1/(1 . 50.19 17.74 25.38 114.62
Sources: The mobile termination rates are from Ovum. All other variables are from Wireless 
Intelligence. The data are from Q1 2003-Q3 2006. The number of observations is 258. This 
comprises 26 operators in Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom.   
Table 1 reveals that the sample comprises firms and markets of considerable 
heterogeneity. The smallest market in the sample comprises about 3.5 million customers 
(Norway in 2003) while the largest, Germany, is well above 80 million in 2006. The 
smallest firm in the sample (relative to market size) has 8 % of the market, while the 
largest (again relative to market size) has 58%.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution in the termination rates per minute, in Eurocents, of the 
firms having the highest and the lowest mtr in each respective market. As may be seen, 
Denmark is the only country that has maintained symmetric termination rates 
throughout the whole period, while Finland and Sweden have periods with symmetric 
termination rates. In general, there have been frequent changes in both levels and the 
degree of asymmetry. Hence, the data should be informative with respect to the impact 
of termination rates on profits. 
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Figure 1. Termination rates per minute in the period 2003 – 2006 
 
The econometric model 
Having clarified the empirical representation of the variables, we can now present the 
econometric model. If we divide both sides of the profit function in 6)  by , we 
obtain  
2
itit sX
 ,2 )1(
1
itit
kkitit
it aa
NsX −
−+−= σ
π . 
Hence an econometric specification that nests the theoretical, equilibrium profit 
function, suitable to the present data, is given by 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )kljkivvEkjivvEvvE
tivaay
jtitkjtitititit
itititiit
≠∈∨∈=∈==
∀+++= −
0,,,,,,,
,,
2
21
ρδ
ββγ
 7) 
where , 2/ itititit sXy π= iγ is a firm specific constant and is an error term. As is 
evident from 7) we allow the errors to be heteroskedastic and correlated within clusters 
defined by each national market. The former accounts for the large heterogeneity in the 
sample, and the latter for the fact that the firms may be subject to country-specific, 
unobservable shocks.
itv
15 
The errors, , are likely to be correlated with the regressors. Even if all operators are 
subject to some form of ex ante regulation in the market for termination of voice calls, 
certain operators may have some discretion in setting their own termination rate. For 
instance, some operators may be subject merely to a “fair and reasonable price” 
obligation, see European Regulators Group (2007). In particular, regulators often allow 
late entrants to set a relatively higher termination rate than incumbents. The motivation 
is normally that a unilateral high termination rate stimulates post-entry profits and 
thereby entry.
itv
16 Thus profits and termination rates may to some extent be determined 
simultaneously. 
Table 2.  Correlations   
 s Ebitda ebitda/customer 
Mtr -0.5** -0.13* -0.35** 
** p < 0.01, * p <0.05 
Table 2 shows the correlation between firms’ own termination rate and some firm 
performance indicators. As is seen, there is a clear tendency that small and/or low-profit 
operators have a higher termination rate. This supports the notion that the model 7) may 
be subject to simultaneity.  
                                                 
15 Correlated error within cross sections in the same country may also be generated by shocks to exchange 
rates since we measure all monetary variables in Euros and some countries in the sample have their own 
currency. 
16 See e.g. European Regulators Group (2006). Carter and Wright (2003) and Peitz [2005a, 2005b] shows 
that a unilateral increase in the termination rate stimulates profits (locally around cost based regulation). 
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The profit measure, ebitda, will in general contain revenue components that are not 
incorporated in the theoretical model, for instance roaming and various kinds of data 
traffic, as well as cost components that are not marginal costs. Thus, we allow for a firm 
specific constant in 7) although the model outlined in the previous section only requires 
a nation specific constant.  
In general, the structure of the theoretical equilibrium profit function makes the 
econometric specification very robust to unobservable firm specific effects. The 
unobservable firm specific effects from the theoretical model, i.e. marginal costs and the 
differentiation parameters, affect profits through market shares only. Since the profit 
function is separable in equilibrium market shares the specification is robust even to 
time variation in these unobservable variables. 
4. Results  
From the discussion in the previous section it is clear that we need a robust panel 
estimator that can take account of correlations between cross-sections within clusters 
(countries) as well as endogeneity. Table 3 below presents the results from GMM 
instrumental variable estimation of the econometric model 7)17. The fixed effects are 
removed by the within transformation.18 The table displays two sets of estimates: 
Models (1)-(3) and models (1a)-(3a). Model 1 is identical to model 1a and so forth 
except that the latter does not include time dummies. We display both sets of results 
because, in order to implement the cluster option, the time dummies had to be 
“partialled out” from the other variables, including excluded instruments, in order to get 
the covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions of full rank, see Baum, Schaffer and 
Stillman (2006). This implies that the coefficients of the time dummies cannot be 
displayed and we cannot perform conventional tests on their impact. We therefore 
present the effect of including them by displaying both sets of results. Appendix A 
shows the results of estimating the model without the cluster option. 
                                                 
17 The results presented in this section are based on a sample where the operators in Denmark have been 
removed. This is because the Danish operators have been subject to symmetric regulation in every 
quarter, which causes the regressors to be perfectly correlated for these cross-sections. 
18 The estimation is performed in the module xtivreg2 for Stata using the gmm, robust, cluster option. 
Prior to estimating the models in Table 3 we ran some regressions with explicit firm dummies and tested 
for heteroskedasticity. All tests revealed a strong presence of heteroskedasticity. 
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To identify the parameters in the model we need a set of instrumental variables - that is 
variables that are a) uncorrelated with the error term and b) correlated with the 
explanatory variables. The candidate instruments are 
1111 )/(,,, −−−−−= itititit custebitdasaaz . Let us start with b) correlation with the 
explanatory variables: The first two variables in z will be correlated with the 
explanatory variables whenever there is some inertia in the termination rates. Current 
termination rates may be correlated with the last two variables if the regulators use these 
firm indicators to determine future termination rates, recall Table 2 and the discussion in 
the previous section. As shown by the first stage regression in Appendix A, there is 
probably no need to worry about weak instruments. The Shea R2 from the first stage 
regressions is in the range of 0.44-0.48. 
Why should be valid? Regarding  and z 1−ita ita− the intuitive argument is that the first 
lag of the right hand side variables is valid instrumental candidates in the static 
regression because it is the current termination rates that affect profits – lagged 
termination rates do not affect contemporary profits except possibly indirectly via 
inertia in the pricing decision. The same argument holds for  and  - 
past performance should not affect profit in a static model.  
1−its 1)/( −itcustebitda
The latter two proposed instruments highlight the fact that the arguments for the 
orthogonality of z depend critically on the assumption that the estimated model is in 
fact static. If the true model is dynamic, will be correlated with the omitted lagged 
endogenous variable and hence invalid. There is however nothing to indicate that this is 
the case. In models (2) and (2a) is used as excluded instruments.  As is evident from 
Table 3, the Hansen J test does not reject null of valid instruments. The same holds for 
regressions using further lags of the variables in .
z
z
z 19  
It is tempting to infer that if the model is in fact static, then  itself should be a valid 
instrument. The models (3) and (3a) use and as excluded instruments and test 
whether  is suspect. Neither the Hansen J nor the C statistics is able to reject the null 
1−ity
z 1−ity
1−ity
                                                 
19 Results not shown here. 
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of validity20. Appendix C shows the results from estimating a dynamic first differenced 
model with the Arellano Bond estimator, Arellano Bond (1991). As can be seen, we 
cannot reject that the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is zero at any 
conventional level of significance. 
Table 3. Termination rates and profit: GMM cluster fixed effects1 
Model: itititiit vaay +++= −21 ββγ   
 (1)2 (2)3 (3)4 (1a)2 (2a)3 (3a)4 
   
ita  1.17** 1.18** 1.16** 1.16** 1.27*** 1.26*** 
 (0.56) (0.53) (0.52)  (0.50) (0.44) (0.44) 
ita−  -0.57 -0.70** -0.68** -0.62* -0.78*** -0.74*** 
 (0.35) (0.32) (0.32)  (0.37) (0.29) (0.28) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No 
   
R2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Obs 236 231 231 236 231 231 
Firms 22 21 21 22 21 21 
Diagnostics6   
Hansen J  0.56 0.70 0.62 0.76 
C Statistic  0.60 0.64 
Endogeneity 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.26 0.18 0.19 
Notes:  
1) The variables are defined in table 1. Standard errors in parentheses. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 0.01%, 0.05% and 0.1% level respectively. All models use 
the within transformation (fixed effects) to handle the firm specific constants. The 
estimation method is two-step GMM with standard errors robust to arbitrary 
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within countries using the xtivreg2 package 
for Stata. In the estimation of (1)-(3) the time dummies are “partialled out”, to get the 
covariance matrix of orthogonality conditions of full rank. 
2) The excluded instruments are the first lag of and a a  
3) The excluded instruments are the first lag of , a a , and ebitda/customer s
4) The excluded instruments are the first lag of , a a , , ebitda/customer and   s y
5) All diagnostics report robust p-values. Hansen J is the Sargan-Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions. The C statistics is the “difference-in-Sargan test” of a subset of 
orthogonality conditions. The instrument tested is the lagged endogenous variable, y . 
Endogeneity is a test of the null hypothesis that and a a are exogenous.  
 
                                                 
20 However, as shown by  Nickell (1981) the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variable is biased 
downwards in a fixed effects regression  -   is correlated with the contemporary error term by 
construction. Thus, the failure to reject  as a suspect instrument in models (3) and (3a) questions the 
strength of the Hansen J and C-statistics in the present context. 
1−ity
1−ity
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The last row in Table 3 reports the test statistics for the null hypothesis that  and ita ita−  
are in fact exogenous variables. We see that exogeneity is rejected at the 10% level for 
models (2) and (3), but not for the other models. Given strong apriori suppositions of 
endogeneity, and a reluctance to rely on the models with no time dummies, we proceed 
with the current estimates. Model (2) is the preferred. 
Turning to the estimated coefficients we see that, except for the exactly identified 
models (1) and (1a), the coefficients are significant at the 5% level for the models with 
time dummies, and at the 1% level for the models without time dummies. The estimates 
are slightly higher in absolute value in the model without time dummies.  
In all models the coefficients have the expected sign - an increase in the own 
termination rate increases , and an increase in competitors’ average termination rate 
decreases  (see the next section for interpretation). Moreover, the coefficients are 
close to 1 and -1 as predicted by the theoretical model.  
ity
ity
Consider the profit neutrality hypothesis, i.e. that an identical change in all termination 
rates in the market does not affect profits. Let { }hahahaha Nrtt +++++= ..,,)( 21 . 
Using 6) and 7) we find that profit neutrality requires that  
 i
sh
sXs
h it
itit
it
it ∀=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂++=∂
∂ ,02212 πββπ . 8) 
A key property of the theoretical model is that market shares are unaffected by an 
identical change in all termination rates in the market i.e., 0=∂∂ hsit . We leave this as 
an untested assumption in this paper21. Conditioned on this, profit neutrality requires 
that 021 =+ ββ . Table 4 below shows the results of testing profit neutrality based on the 
previous empirical results. 
                                                 
21 We have not attempted to estimate market shares as a function of termination rates in this paper. The 
reason is lack of instruments: Market shares are subject to a high degree of inertia. Hence, contrary to 
estimation of profit functions, we cannot use lagged values of termination rates as instruments.     
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Table 4. Tests of profit neutrality 
 1 2 3 1a 2a 3a 
Ho: β1 = β2 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.09 0.07
P-value reported. Test statistics are obtained from  
the corresponding models in Table 3. 
 
 
As seen from Table 4, neither model rejects the null at the 5% level. The preferred 
model, 2), does not reject the null at the 10% level (prob value=0.13). We conclude that 
we cannot reject that the operator’s profits are unaffected by an identical change in all 
termination rates22.  
Discussion  
The results give no strong support for the concern raised in the literature that the level of 
termination rates may be used as collusive device by operators - recall the results form 
symmetric equilibrium that operators prefer a high level when competing in linear 
prices [Armstrong (1998), Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a)], and a low level when 
competing in two-part tariffs with network based discrimination [Gans and King 
(2001)].  
Although the current model does not explicitly consider price structure, i.e. the pricing 
of the components in the bundle of subscription and calls, the profit neutrality result is 
consistent with a key special case in the theoretical literature, namely that of 
competition with two-part tariffs with no network based discrimination in symmetric 
duopoly, Laffont Rey and Tirole (1998a). In this model the fall in the call price 
following a decrease in the termination rates is exactly matched by an increase in the 
subscription fee leaving profit unchanged. This is a 100% percent “waterbed effect”. A 
waterbed effect exists when downward adjustment in one price (e.g. termination) leads 
to an upward adjustment in another price. Genakos and Valletti (2008) also find a 
significant waterbed effect.  
The profit neutrality result in the present paper is consistent with a 100% waterbed 
effect. The European Commission (2008) expects a reduction in termination rates to 
                                                 
22 It should be mentioned that this does not mean that we can accept the null hypothesis. Indeed, neither 
can we reject that there is a small but positive effect on operators’ profit. 
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benefit consumers in terms of lower prices. There are strong theoretical reasons to 
believe that a reduction of all termination rates will lead to lower call prices. However, 
the present results are consistent with the conjecture that this reduction will be 
accompanied by a raise in other prices i.e. subscription charges, thus leaving profits and 
consumer benefits roughly unchanged. 
Further research should look into the effects of changes in operator specific termination 
rates on profit and market shares23. Apart from providing a test on the assumption 
underlying the present profit neutrality result, confer equation 8), this is an important 
step in assessing the impact of a reduction in termination rate asymmetry as proposed by 
the European Comission (2008). To interpret the present results note that 7) implies 
 12 2
1 βππ =⎟⎟⎠
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Thus, inference on the effect of a change in the termination rate structure on profits 
based on the present results requires information on the marginal effect on market 
shares. Awaiting empirical evidence we may note the following theoretical results: In 
the two-firm model 0=∂∂=∂∂ jiii asas  as shown by Armstrong (2002). Andersson 
(2009), finds that 0>∂∂ ii as  and 0<∂∂ asi , analysing the current model in a market 
with three firms. Drawing on these results, we assert that the empirical results are 
consistent with the intuition that an increase in own (competitors’) termination rate 
increase (decrease) profit.   
                                                 
23 It would also be useful to derive and estimate profit functions relaxing some of the assumptions in the 
current model. For instance theoretical models that take a fixed network into account, see e.g Armstrong 
and Wright (2008) and Hansen (2006), suggest that if the total number of mobile subscribers is elastic, the 
mobile operators gain from a symmetric increase in MTRs. This may be consistent with the current 
results  
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5. Concluding remarks 
We set up a theoretical model of multi-firm competition between interconnected, 
asymmetric mobile networks. The key assumptions are that the demand for calls is 
inelastic and identical between operators, and that markets are fully penetrated. We 
show that the operators’ equilibrium profit is unaffected by an identical change in all 
termination rates in the market. Taking this model to a data set comprising mobile 
operators in mature European markets we find that the econometric model performs 
well. The main result is that we cannot reject that profits are unaffected by an identical 
change in all mobile termination rates in the market. 
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Appendix A 
Table A1. Termination rates and profit. GMM fixed effects, no clusters 
Model: itititiit vaay +++= −21 ββγ   
 (1) (2) (3) (1a) (2a) (3a) 
   
ita  1.17 1.20 1.18 1.16 1.26 1.23
 (0.46) (0.45) (0.44) (0.50) (0.49) (0.49) 
ita−  -0.57 -0.66 -0.61 -0.62 -0.74 -0.69
 (0.45) (0.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0.48) (0.47) 
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
   
R2 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.05 0.05
N 236 231 231 236 231 231
N_g 22 21 21 22 21 21
       
Hansen J  0.48 0.65 0.58 0.74
C Statistics  0.59 0.67 0.64 0.71
Endogeneity 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.11
Notes, see Table 3.   
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Appendix B 
 Table B1. First stage regressions*  
 (1) (1a) (2) (2a) (3) (3a) 
 
ita  ita−  ita ita− ita ita−
1−ita  0.78 0.14 0.83 0.15 0.82 0.15
 (11.24) (2.70) (18.09) (3.12) (17.56) (3.47)
ita−  -0.08 0.55 -0.12 0.55 -0.12 0.55
 (-1.28) (7.29) (-3.24) (7.83) (-4.78) (8.59)
1−its    -6.59 8.65 -4.72 8.35
   (-0.43) (0.45) (-0.35) (0.38)
1)/( −tcustebitda    -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 -0.06
   (-1.45) (-3.39) (-0.75) (-0.97)
1−ity    0.01 0.00
   (0.18) (-0.05)
   
Shea R2 0.45 0.44 0.47 0.45 0.48 0.45
N 236 236 231 231 231 231
N_g 22 22 21 21 21 21
   
* t values in parentheses.   
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Appendix C. Dynamic models 
Table C1. Termination rates and profits: Arellano-Bond dynamic panel1 
Model: ititititiit vaayy ++++= −− 2110 βββγ  
Variable (1)2 (2)2 
 
1−ity  0.02 0.07
 (0.09) (0.10) 
ita  1.10 1.45*
 (0.73) (0.83) 
ita−  -0.61 -1.15
 (0.90) (0.89) 
Time dummies yes no
 
Obs 228 228
Firms 21 21
 
Diagnostics3 
AR(1) -1.78* -1.71*
AR(2) -0.04 -0.27
Sargan 1.94 18.29
Notes:  
1) The variables are defined in Table 1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * 
denotes significance at the 10% level. The model uses first differences to handle the 
firm specific effects. The estimation method is Arellano-Bond dynamic panel data using 
the xtabond package for Stata, see Arellano and Bond (1991). The reported estimates 
are first step, except Sargan which is two-step.  
2) andita ita− are treated as endogeneous with the second lags of s and ebitda/cust as 
additional instruments. All valid orthogonality conditions up to 5 lags are used.  
3) AR(1) is the Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 
0, AR(2) is the corresponding test of average autocovariance of order 2. Sargan is the 
Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions. The p-values of both Sargan 
statistics are 1, note however that the Sargan-Hansen statistics in these model are well 
known to have little power. 
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